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The Limits of Liability: Anglo-American Organisations 
and Vicarious Liability from the 19th Century to the 
Present 
 




| This paper, ‘Limits of Liability’, shall focus on the recent history of the 
concept of vicarious liability in Anglo-American common law from the 19th 
century to the present. | 
 
Vicarious liability – often called respondeat superior in the United States –
concerns holding employers (‘masters’) liable for torts committed by their 
employees (‘servants’), even when the employer is not at fault. In Anglo-
American common law, it has been a principle for over 150 years.1 There are 
references to the doctrine in cases dating back to the Middle Ages, but vicarious 
liability primarily evolved into its modern form in the nineteenth century. Such 
a development was driven by the necessities of the industrial age, with 
increasing technological and commercial development creating a more ‘fertile’ 
environment for claims involving the doctrine.2 As time has worn on and 
businesses have become larger, however, vicarious liability has been applied in 
cases where the employee-employer relationship has been increasingly distant 
and the tort committed increasingly contrary to the tortfeasor’s ‘scope of 
employment’. Subsequently, organisations in England and the United States 
at present must be increasingly weary of their employees or ‘servants’. This 
paper will first give a historical overview of the development of vicarious 
liability before analysing the reasons in case law which have led to this 
situation in Anglo-American law, drawing upon twentieth-century legal 
scholarship from both sides of the Atlantic which plotted and commentated on 
the increasingly liberal application of vicarious liability. The paper will then 
view three common justifications for vicarious liability, which lend to the 
reasoning for the development of the doctrine. Finally, the paper will look at 
 
1 Green, Respondeat Superior 
2 Gilker, Vicarious Liability in Tort, 6-8. 
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very recent legislation, viewing possible issues for the doctrine in the near 
future.  
The traceable development of vicarious liability in common law in England and 
the United States of America stretches back to the early to mid-nineteenth 
century. It was then when the basic principles were laid down as guidance for 
the application of vicarious liability. In the United States, Wright v Wilcox 
(1838) 19 Wend. (N.Y.) 343 established the principle that malicious intent by 
the servant in the course of employment removes the master’s vicarious 
liability for the actions of their servant.3 The court in that case also established 
the idea that a master is only responsible if it can be proved that the master 
assented to the servant’s carrying out the tort.4 In England, Joel v Morison 
(1834) established that the master was not vicariously liable if the servant 
acted “on a frolic of his own.”5 Essentially, England and the United States 
founded the doctrine on a similar ‘test’ – that is, the establishment of whether 
the servant was acting in the interest of their master or in the interest of 
themselves. Such a simple test received an initial, but mostly terminological, 
development in England in the 1860s, following cases including Limpus v 
London General Omnibus Co (1862), where “scope of employment” replaced 
“course of employment” (the latter used in Joel v Morrison) to ascertain 
whether assent from the master to the servant for their tort was implicitly given 
by being in the interest of the task(s) the servant was employed to do.6 “Scope 
of employment” has since been a basis for determining the application of 
vicarious liability in English common law to the present. In America, malicious 
intent as an exemption from vicarious liability was overturned as a legal 
distinction soon after Wright v Wilcox, but malice was still considered when 
determining vicarious liability in courts.7 Around the turn of the twentieth 
century, another distinction emerged affecting the application of vicarious 
liability in both England and America. Allan W. Leiser pointed out in 1956 that 
vicarious liability was applied more reluctantly in the United States when the 
 
3 Master and Servant, 186 
4 Brill, The Liability of an Employer, 4. 
5 (1834) 6 C & P 501. 
6 (1862) 1 H & C 526. 
7 Master and Servant, 186. 
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servant had committed a wilful act, rather than a negligent one. The Michigan 
and Texas courts, in cases in 1911 and 1891 respectively, reasoned that wilful 
acts were less predictable than negligent ones and, as such, fall outside the 
scope of employment.8 A different distinction emerged in English law. In Lloyd 
v Grace, Smith & Co (1912), no distinction between wilful and negligent acts 
was added. Instead, overturning the old precedent that, in the words of Willes 
J, the act must be “for the master’s benefit”, the House of Lords deemed that 
the fraudulent acts of a managing clerk in a solicitor’s firm did not have to 
benefit the firm in order to hold the firm vicariously liable.9 As such, the idea 
that vicarious liability should only be applied to cases where the master 
benefitted from the tort was removed from the law.  
By the mid-twentieth century the exemption of wilful acts from vicarious 
liability was overturned in the United States, giving way to a definition similar 
to that in English common law. The wilfulness exemption to the doctrine was 
overturned in a Virginia case (among others) in 1948, where it was deemed 
that the master was vicariously liable if the wilful act was committed in the 
interest of the master’s business. A more radical ‘liberalisation’ of the doctrine 
emerged in a 1955 Georgia court case, which saw the distinction move between 
determining whether the servant had willingly stepped out of his employment, 
to whether the servant’s act was sufficiently close in connection to their 
employment to hold the master vicariously liable for it.10 
This ‘close connection test’ has been the emphasis of vicarious liability cases in 
England since the end of the twentieth century. The change has shifted the 
paradigm of vicarious liability further away from the nineteenth century 
‘wilful’ and ‘master’s benefit’ considerations. Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd (2001) 
was a mark of this change. In this case, the warden of a boarding annex of a 
school was found guilty of sexually abusing the boys in the annex. A Court of 
Appeal decision rejected the initial claim of vicarious liability against Hesley 
Hall Ltd, but an appeal in the House of Lords found Hesley Hall Ltd vicariously 
liable for the sexual abuse of the boys by the warden, despite acting clearly 
 
8 Leiser, Respondeat Superior, 338-339. 
9 [1912] UKHL 606. 
10 Leiser, Respondeat Superior, 340 
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outside the ‘scope of employment’.11 The doctrine of vicarious liability evolved 
in two ways in this case. Lister set the precedent that masters could be found 
vicariously liable for sexual abuse by servants and the opportunity to commit 
a tort – derived from the authority provided by their position as a servant – 
could lead to claims of the doctrine against employers. It must be noted that 
Lord Millett did draw upon the Australian case Deatons Pty Ltd v Flew (1949) 
79 CLR 370 to distinguish how the ‘opportunity’ component is negated when a 
supervisor to the tortious servant is present when the tort is committed.12 
Nevertheless, Lister v Hesley Hall created a precedent which left vicarious 
liability open to further expansion. Indeed, more recent cases and appeals in 
English courts, such as The Catholic Child Welfare Society v Various 
Claimants and the Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools and others 
(2012)13 has demonstrated the result of this expansion. In this case (also called 
the ‘Christian Brothers’ case), the Institute of Brothers of Christian Schools 
was found vicariously liable for the sexual abuse of boys by the volunteers in 
the Institute (the ‘brothers’), given the fact that the servants had been placed 
in relationships by the boys where there was a “significantly enhanced risk” of 
sexual abuse.14 
Recent editions of legal reviews in the United States have highlighted a marked 
rigidity – compared to the English courts at least – in the application of the 
doctrine regarding sexual misconduct (the central issue of the ‘Christian 
Brothers’ case). Since the 1980s, courts in states including Georgia and 
Connecticut have dismissed vicarious liability claims involving intentional 
sexual misconduct by the servants.15 The Californian courts in Lisa M v. Henry 
Mayo Newhall regarded “opportunity” to commit a tort alone insufficient for 
vicarious liability to hold; rather, an “emotional involvement” between the 
tortfeasor and victim and authority deemed as “coercive” are necessary for the 
doctrine to hold on the grounds of the ‘scope of employment’ angle.16 
Regarding religious ‘masters’, a doctrine has been established in the United 
 
11 [2001] UKHL 22. 
12 [2001] UKHL 22, para 81. 
13 [2012] UKSC 56. 
14 [2012] UKHL 56, para 85-87. 
15 Hornbeck, Four Approaches, 993-994. 
16 Sartor, The Implications of Fearing v. Bucher, 712. 
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States some call “church autonomy”, whereby religious employers are treated 
(in a general sense) as not being liable for the torts of their servants. This 
doctrine is particularly pronounced with denominations like the Catholic 
Church, where sexual abuse by ‘servants’ is specifically forbidden. Some have 
questioned this doctrine, particularly since the aforementioned ‘coercive 
authority’ idea is very much applicable with many sexual abuse cases in the 
Catholic Church.17 
As such, ‘opportunity’ to commit a tort, derived from the authority invested in 
a servant by the master, has become an important part of Anglo-American 
common law decisions on vicarious liability. The ‘church autonomy’ idea in 
American common law puts vicarious liability under greater constraints than 
in English common law. Are these constraints necessary? Just because the 
Catholic Church specifically forbids sexual assault should not mean that 
vicarious liability should be treated differently. The secular laws of both 
England and the United States explicitly forbid sexual assault, so why should 
a Church authority be any different? Later in the paper, a significant American 
case challenging this unusual exemption will be discussed. Before discussion 
of very recent legislation, an assessment of the various rationales for the 
doctrine of vicarious liability in Anglo-American common law should be made 
to fully understand why it exists in the expanded state it does today. Theories 
for the expansion of the doctrine are grounded in the fundamental idea that 
vicarious liability is ultimately a matter of public policy. Paragraph 40 of 
Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets Plc (2016) made this much clear.18 
There is, though, a great deal of nuance to be considered within the sphere of 
public policy. Several theories have been suggested as to exactly why one might 
be held vicariously liable in increasingly extreme circumstances, which will 
now be discussed.   
Firstly, arguably the most prominent theory justifying vicarious liability is that 
of the “deeper pockets” theory.19 This idea is rather straightforward: it posits 
 
17 Hornbeck, Four Approaches, 997-998. 
18 [2016] UKSC 11, para 40. 
19 Luskin, Caring About Corporate “Due Care”, 304. Leiser, Respondeat Superior, 341. Brill, 
The Liability of an Employer, 2. Sykes, An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability, 172. 
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that vicarious liability is claimed against ‘masters’ because they are often much 
better placed to compensate the victim of a servant’s tort than the servant 
themselves.20 It must be noted that this theory is not considered as per se 
sufficient justification for the application of the doctrine21 – indeed, if this were 
(absurdly) the case, litigation would rarely be needed for vicarious liability. It 
does, however, fit well as a theory into the wider ‘public policy’ framework of 
the doctrine. Punishment of the servant is dealt with separately to vicarious 
liability cases but may not yield civil compensation for victims of the servant’s 
tort. As such, it is only right that the party best placed to compensate for the 
actions of the servant – often the master – should offer compensation instead. 
As such, vicarious liability works to this end in that it compels the master to 
offer such compensation. The ‘deeper pockets’ rationale for vicarious liability 
is therefore understandable, though insufficient in itself as a reason for the 
expanding number of cases to which it is applied.  
The second prominent justification for the doctrine is one based on fault. That 
a master has appointed a careless servant to a position of responsibility, or 
failed to supervise them appropriately, means that the master should therefore 
bear some of the burden of the servant’s tort.22 Indeed, the aforementioned 
Australian case Deatons v Flew – which has influenced English cases – the 
barmaid who committed the tort was being supervised and, subsequently, the 
bar was not charged as vicariously liable.23Though this justification is a 
sensible one, the implication for companies and other ‘masters’ is that they 
must ensure that their employees are constantly under authoritative 
monitoring from a superior in the company. In reality, how feasible is this? 
Businesses have to balance their human capital costs against the likelihood of 
a situation in which vicarious liability might arise. For example, in Mohamud 
v WM Morrison Supermarkets Plc (2016), Morrisons was held vicariously 
liable for the intentional assault of a customer by a petrol station attendant. 
Following a verbal altercation in the kiosk, the attendant left the kiosk to 
 
20 Brill, The Liability of an Employer, 2-3. 
21 Sykes, An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability, 172. 
22 Gilker, Vicarious Liability, 231. 
23 [2001] UKHL 22, para 81. 
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pursue the customer, whom he then assaulted.24 As such, is it really 
economically viable for Morrisons to constantly employ a supervisor in every 
petrol station to avoid the costs of a vicarious liability claim? It is 
understandable that courts have to uphold the social responsibility firms 
should have in society, which consists of – on a basic level – ensuring that their 
employees should follow the law. In many occupations, however, the risk of 
serious torts being committed within the ‘scope of employment’ should be 
incredibly small. On the other hand, consider a counterfactual in Mohamud 
briefly. If it was held that Morrisons was not vicariously liable for the assault 
of a customer by a petrol station attendant, it might encourage a laissez-faire 
attitude among firms to the actions of their employees. As such, this second 
justification is an essential axiom when making full case-by-case assessments 
of vicarious liability claims.  
The third and final justification, closely linked with the second, is the 
deterrence idea. This idea suggests that vicarious liability has a net beneficial 
effect to society in that it encourages employers to be vigilant to their 
employees’ behaviour and, subsequently, reduce the chances of tortious acts 
being committed by the employees to third parties.25 Being the most able to 
influence the decision of their employees during their course of employment, 
it should be the responsibility of employers to protect against future harm. The 
deterrence argument is an important consideration in the application of 
vicarious liability to specific cases. In holding a ‘master’ as vicariously liable for 
their servant’s actions, it sends a message not only to the master/employer in 
question, but all employers, that they should be wary of their servants’ actions. 
The demerits of this approach to vicarious liability were partially discussed in 
the previous paragraph. Though there are many realistic measures which 
employers can take to prevent their employees from committing torts, 
business costs have to be measured against the likelihood of a serious tort 
occurring within the course of employment. This might seem like a very cold 
approach but, as a business, profit margins are naturally a vital consideration.   
 
24 2016] UKSC 11 
25 Gilker, Vicarious Liability, 241-242. 
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Following on from the third justification, should considerations about the 
‘type’ of employer be made? With businesses, the profit motive means that it 
might not be in the best interests of businesses to try their best to protect 
against employees’ torts, as the costs of protection might outweigh any 
compensatory payments from a rare vicarious liability claim. There is also the 
additional element regarding firms that as paid employees, it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that servants have considered the risk of losing their 
financial livelihood before – or during – committing a specific tort. How 
effective, then, is ‘deterrence’ as a motive against private businesses? The 
financial burden of deterring torts is their largest consideration. Voluntary 
organisations, however, do not have to bear the cost considerations of salaried 
employees. To increase supervision of servants in a voluntary organisation is 
not subject to the cost considerations of salaried employees. As such, the 
‘deterrent’ motive for enforcing vicarious liability should theoretically be more 
effective in voluntary groups than in businesses, as voluntary groups do not 
have to bear employment costs and can, as such, modify the structure of their 
organisations at a smaller expense than that of private firms.  
It is clear that vicarious liability has expanded considerably from its 
nineteenth-century grounding, but some of this expansion is perfectly 
understandable. Common law is a system designed in such a manner so that 
law can move with the times. Indeed, vicarious liability has been, as Lord 
Philips said in ‘Christian Brothers’, “on the move.”26 But have the fundamental 
principles changed from the original essence of the doctrine? The ‘scope of 
employment’ test was the early basic foundation for vicarious liability, with the 
‘close connection’ test seeking to provide a more expansive idea of ‘scope’, 
where actions were connected with opportunities presented by the authority of 
the employment. Recently, however, cases involving a vicarious liability claim 
have questioned the application of the doctrine to ‘masters’ beyond the form 
of a business constituting ‘employer’ and ‘employees’, including 
unincorporated associations, voluntary organisations, and the Catholic 
Church. To these groups, finding a ‘close connection’ is even more important, 
 
26 [2012] UKSC 56. 
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since the level of control that the ‘masters’ have over ‘servants’ who are not 
direct employees is not as clear prima facie as in a standard employment 
relationship.  
Though vicarious liability has seen movement in the past two decades, two 
recent UK Supreme Court decisions might have brought this movement to a 
necessary halt. The judgments of WM Morrison Supermarkets plc v Various 
Claimants (2020)27 and Barclays Bank plc v Various Claimants (2020)28 were 
both given on the same day this year, holding that both WM Morrison 
Supermarkets plc and Barclays Bank plc were not vicariously liable for the torts 
of their ‘servants.’ In the former case, an internal auditor of Morrisons 
breached the Data Protection Act by sending the payroll data of over 100,000 
Morrisons employees to three UK newspapers. The task he had originally been 
assigned to do was to share the payroll data with KPMG so that they could test 
their accuracy in an external audit. The Supreme Court held that the internal 
auditor was acting outside the scope of the tasks assigned to him, stating that 
the “opportunity” to commit the tort alone did not mean that Morrisons was 
vicariously liable.29 In the latter case, a doctor, as an independent contractor 
used by Barclays Bank plc, was tasked with carrying out the medical 
examinations in Barclays’s application process. The doctor sexually abused 
some of the applicants during the medical examinations. The Supreme Court 
held that Barclays was not vicariously liable for the sexual abuse by the doctor 
on the basis that his relationship with Barclays was not close enough to be 
construed as employment, hence representing the modern importance of 
indirect master-servant relationships in vicarious liability cases today.30 
The significance of the UK Supreme Court’s repudiating the continued 
expansion of vicarious liability is that the Supreme Court has now set definite 
limits of vicarious liability as a doctrine. There has been no change of the 
principles of vicarious liability which could warrant further expansion; indeed, 
‘scope of employment’ seems as relevant a consideration now as it did in the 
 
27 [2020] UKSC 12. 
28 [2020] UKSC 13. 
29 [2020] UKSC 12. 
30 [2020] UKSC 13. 
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nineteenth century. The ‘close connection’ test had to be made as a necessary 
consideration of how servants can abuse the authority handed to them by their 
masters. But the important principle of these decisions is that the courts of 
England will now be able to more clearly identify instances where vicarious 
liability should not be held.  As such, it may help set the doctrine ‘on ice’ for a 
time, given that vicarious liability has expanded considerably since the 
nineteenth century and courts should be weary of ‘overexpansion’. By bringing 
more ‘master-servant’ style relationships into the fold of vicarious liability, 
courts have the potential to inhibit judicial economy, even when public policy 
considerations are made. The situation in American common law stands at a 
similar point. Though American courts have been reluctant in applying the 
doctrine both in instances of intentional torts and when religious employers 
are involved, cases like Fearing v Bucher 977 P.2d 1163 (Or. 1999) have put 
institutions of religious faith under greater scrutiny and suggests that the 
intentional torts exemption is being moved aside.31‘Gig economy’ jobs are set 
to be the new frontier of the vicarious liability doctrine. Though it is rare for 
firms hiring independent contractors to be held as vicariously liable unless 
there is a “high level of control”,32 people who work for firms like Uber straddle 
the line between independent contractor and employee. As a result, US courts 
have expressed difficulty in providing an exact definition for ‘master-servant’ 
relationships in this grey area.33 
Anglo-American courts will undoubtedly continue to struggle defining the 
exact boundaries of vicarious liability, particularly with the increasing 
complexity of relationships which can be considered akin to employment. The 
largest recent developments have been about placing sexual abuse as being 
within the ‘close connection’ radius of vicarious liability tests. Religious 
employers have, as evidenced the judgments in Fearing v Bucher and 
‘Christian Brothers’, found themselves increasingly within reach of vicarious 
liability. Courts have recognised that “spiritual authority” offered by roles in a 
religious organisation can lead to these ‘servants’ committing torts, 
 
31 Sartor, The Implications of Fearing v. Bucher, 690-691. Patrick Hornbeck, Four 
Approaches, 1030. 
32 Pager, Priest, Redeeming Globalization, 2490. 
33 Vazquez, The Sharing Revolution, 650-651. 
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subsequently meaning that religious organisations can equally be found 
vicariously liable as ‘servants.’34 Wilful torts and torts for the servant’s benefit 
can now result in successful vicarious liability claims against masters, 
representing the largest contrasts in the doctrine between the nineteenth 
century and the present. Nevertheless, these aspects are still important 
considerations in cases today. In Mohamud, the fact that the servant told the 
third party not to return to the petrol station suggested that the servant was 
acting to benefit the master, ultimately contributing to the judgment that 
Morrisons was vicariously liable.35 The two aforementioned 2020 UK Supreme 
Court decisions suggest that limits to the expansion of the doctrine are now 
being set – for the time being. In America, the blurring of the independent 
contractor exemption may lead to further expansion of vicarious liability. 
When deciding whether to expand the doctrine further, however, the courts 
should always remember why they are doing it. When holding organisations 
vicariously liable, courts must bear in mind the public policy implications of 
doing so. The actual tests for vicarious liability – the ‘close connection’ and 
‘scope of employment’ tests – are of course vital to the outcomes of cases, but 
when judgments are on the fence, what really needs to be asked is whether the 
outcome of the case will actually deter future torts. The UK Supreme Court’s 
recent judgments suggests that some ‘limits of liability’ may have indeed been 
set, but the proliferation of employers and ‘servant’ roles in the ‘gig economy’ 
means that those limits might yet be pushed further. 
 
34 Hornbeck, Four Approaches, 1027-1028. 
35 [2016] UKSC 11, para 47. 
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